Objective. Students will ingest structured threat intelligence feeds into a SIEM or threat intelligence platform and use IOCs to enrich an active incident investigation.
This lesson, its worked examples and its practice questions has not yet been verified by an industry-certified professional or by a certification or approval body. It is a study draft and may contain errors. Do not use it as instructions for work on a job site or on live equipment. Always follow your instructor, your supervising professional, and current official references and regulations.
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Threat intelligence is analyzed information about adversary capabilities, infrastructure, and intentions that helps defenders make faster, better decisions. Raw data — a list of IP addresses, for example — is not intelligence until it has been processed, contextualized, and validated. During an active incident, enriching your findings with current threat intelligence can confirm attribution, reveal additional compromised systems, and accelerate containment.
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) are sector-specific organizations (financial, healthcare, energy, etc.) that distribute vetted threat intelligence among member organizations. Sharing through an ISAC multiplies the defensive value of every indicator your organization discovers, while consuming shared indicators from others extends your visibility beyond what your own logs can show.
An IOC is an observable artifact that signals a system may be compromised. Common IOC types include:
Not all IOCs age equally. IP addresses rotate frequently and may belong to shared hosting; acting on a stale IP can produce false positives or miss an evolved campaign. Behavioral indicators derived from adversary tactics tend to remain valid longer because changing behavior is more costly for attackers than spinning up a new IP.
STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) is a JSON-based language for describing cyber threat intelligence objects — threats, campaigns, malware, indicators, courses of action, and relationships between them. STIX 2.x is the current version and is used by MISP, commercial platforms, and government feeds.
TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information) is the transport protocol that moves STIX bundles between servers and clients over HTTPS. Think of STIX as the language and TAXII as the delivery truck. A TAXII server exposes collections; a client authenticates and pulls or subscribes to bundles.
Together, STIX/TAXII enable machine-readable, automated IOC sharing at scale — replacing slower, error-prone manual processes like emailing CSV spreadsheets.
MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) is a free, open-source threat intelligence platform maintained by the CIRCL community. It can:
In this lab you will either connect to a simulated TAXII feed or import a sample STIX bundle directly into MISP, then push resulting IOCs to the lab SIEM.
Once MISP exports IOCs, the SIEM must be configured to consume them. The general workflow is:
1. Export IOCs from MISP in a format the SIEM accepts (CSV lookup table, JSON feed, or native integration).
2. Create or update a lookup list/watchlist in the SIEM populated with those IOCs.
3. Write correlation rules that join incoming log events against the lookup: `source_ip IN threat_feed_ips` or `dns.query IN threat_feed_domains`.
4. Set alert priority based on IOC confidence and TLP marking.
5. Schedule regular refresh so the lookup stays current.
Test your rule by replaying a log event that contains a known IOC from the feed. If the rule fires, the pipeline is working.
MITRE ATT&CK is a publicly available knowledge base of adversary tactics (the why) and techniques (the how). Mapping IOCs and observed behaviors to ATT&CK IDs:
The ATT&CK Navigator is a free, browser-based tool that lets you annotate the ATT&CK matrix with colors and notes. During this lab you will highlight techniques observed in a previous scenario, record the ATT&CK IDs (e.g., T1566.001 for Spearphishing Attachment), and identify at least two mitigations per technique from the ATT&CK website.
Sharing benefits the entire community but carries risk. Key considerations:
Behavioral IOCs (ATT&CK-mapped TTPs) are generally safer to share than raw IPs because they carry less personal data and degrade more slowly.
All lab work uses isolated virtual environments and sample/simulated data only. Never connect lab tools to live production SIEM instances or real organizational feeds without explicit written authorization. Handle any sample data that includes realistic-looking personal information (names, IPs from real ranges) as if it were sensitive — do not post it publicly or share it outside the lab network. Follow your program's acceptable-use policy for all cloud-based tools including the ATT&CK Navigator.
Answer each question, then check it. Nothing is recorded; this is your own practice.
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